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and of their decision-making processes. Similarly, although Forbes provides 
some invaluable data on the Maritime economy, this is done in an essentially 
descriptive kind of way and is meant to provide the context for a story which is 
told in primarily political terms. 
However important the political account may be, it represents only part of the 
evidence and we need as well the kinds of insights that can be offered by the 
economic historian. To what extent, for example, were events finally determined 
by those like the Kemps, the Flavelles and National Trust, who do appear in this 
account from time to time? Is it possible that the political events which created 
the Maritime Rights Movement were of little long-run significance? Equally, the 
historian of ideas has much to offer to our understanding of Canadian region-
alism, and Ernie Forbes' conclusion that Maritime protest declined because 
people had lost confidence in their own slogans points to the need for further 
work along those lines. In any case, this study provides an excellent foundation 
for those who will undertake further analysis of the Maritime region in the early 
twentieth century; and I hope it will stimulate other scholars, and of course 
Forbes himself, to move in that direction. 
PETER OLIVER 
The Brief Rise And Early Decline Of Regional Development 
In the 1960s Canadians still enjoyed the widespread happy belief, born in the 
1940s and reaching its peak of credibility in the first half of the 50s, that the 
world was right for Canada; we saw ourselves flourishing in the good earth of 
social content and political stability with a unique northern vigour for fertilizer; 
the predominant assumption — of outsiders quite as much as of Canadians 
themselves — was that under wise management from Ottawa the Canadian 
economy would enjoy diversification and growth second to few if any others. In 
this environment, problems were seen essentially as exceptions. Even the 
strongest economic growth could not, of course, be uniform. But while there 
were declining areas and slow-growth regions, in the conventional wisdom of the 
Ottawa of 1950 this did not call for regional policies. The need for a little oil at 
squeaky points was accepted as a political necessity; some under-utilized 
wharves and trains and ferries and the like were a small price to pay for sticking 
to sound policies to expand the gross national product. For the most part, people 
in slow-growth regions could surely be expected to appreciate the blessing of 
having opportunities to move to elsewhere in Canada. Mobility as the price of 
economic efficiency appealed to the puritanical streak in-Ottawa mandarins. 
As more people began to take prosperity, actual or at least attainable, for 
granted, mandarin views became, by the later 1950s, politically unacceptable. 
Regional discontents coalesced. In the 1960s it became the emerging political 
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wisdom that a strong national economy had to be buttressed by special develop-
ment policies for its weaker parts. The Ottawa bureaucracy for the most part 
never liked that shift, but it gained enough backing elsewhere to produce, from 
the mid-60s, some notable ventures in regional policy. As so often, however, the 
wisdom became even partly conventional only when the presuppositions from 
which it was derived were becoming inapplicable. The national economy was 
ceasing to be strong. Quite early in the 70s, consequently, the regional develop-
ment ventures took on the character of running faster and faster in order to stay 
about where we were. 
That regional policy has not produced the hoped-for improvements is not 
grounds for any sweeping condemnation of it as ill-conceived; the alternative in 
the 1970s would probably have been a period of major deterioration in Atlantic 
Canada. But might-have-beens are not strong arguments in politics. The 
perceived results of regional policy are disappointing, to say the least. While 
many of the same things are still said, in the Maritimes at least, they increasing-
ly have the tone of ritual responses. Regional development as a national concern 
has faded because other economic problems have become greatly more 
troublesome. We must sadly recognize that the development thrust has run into 
the sands and at this point nothing to replace it is in prospect. Once again, we 
have a policy vacuum. 
It is easy to understand how we got where we are, but we must avoid the trap 
of treating what is understandable as unavoidable. The adverse forces were 
strong but they could have been dealt with more effectively and the outcomes 
could have been different. The failure was not star-dictated; it was intellectual. 
The sad fact is that, despite the obvious strength of regional concerns in a 
country as large and thinly populated and diverse as Canada, regional policies 
have been allowed to be the most unclear of public issues. It is a paradox that 
while we have worried more than almost any country about a national identity, 
our intellectuals have had little to offer on distinctively Canadian issues. The 
universities have done, with liberal help from immigrant scholars, our small-
scale best in the academic disciplines of the rest of the western world. With few 
notable exceptions, the academic community has not for the past generation 
provided much in stimulation or guidance to the public-policy community, to 
the politicians and officials and businessmen and labour leaders and the rest, 
struggling with the Canadian problem. It is not entirely the fault of Ottawa that 
quite a lot of our policy troubles have been accentuated by seeing ourselves as 
more like other western countries than reality requires. The four books that are 
the subject of this review illustrate this point all too clearly. 
The most important is the one that deals with a relatively small topic. David 
Alexander's The Decay of Trade (St. John's, Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, Memorial University, 1977), an economic history of the Newfound-
land saltfish trade over the thirty years from 1935, is a careful description 
grounded on detailed research, illuminated by perceptive analysis and enlivened 
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by shrewd comment. It is, in other words, the kind of study that is too rare. Its 
broader significance is that it documents by example the irrelevance and worse 
of most of the assumptions and attitudes not only of academic discussion but of 
governmental consideration at both federal and provincial levels. 
It will surprise many people that, if there are heroes in Mr. Alexander's 
account, they are men who tried hard, intelligently and with considerable risk-
taking, to sell Newfoundland salt fish, particularly in Europe. They failed to 
save the industry for two main reasons. First, Canadian economic and trade 
policies were oriented to quite different objectives and gave no support either in 
general or in particular. Mr. Alexander says bitterly: "Newfoundland's saltfish 
trade was both an oddity and a rather distasteful ancient relative within the 
glossy modernity of branch-plant Canada" (p. viii). Second, other countries did 
not have such inhibitions. There was a market for salt fish, but it was for an 
improving product; the quality of Newfoundland fish deteriorated badly relative 
to that of competitors. A stew of social, political and organizational problems 
stultified efforts to overcome the defective grading and defective curing that 
made sales organization as such ineffective. This part of the failure must be 
attributed as much to Newfoundland politics as to federal misconception and 
indifference. The result was that, in a situation that called for sophisticating 
marketing, improving quality and expanding output of all fish products, actual 
policy was a half-hearted effort to substitute frozen for cured fish production. In 
practice the frozen sector was mishandled while the saltfish trade was discarded, 
and a major resource was forfeited to fishing fleets from distant countries. How 
good a job will now be made of the recovery has to be seen, but this book 
certainly does not leave one with any great confidence in either political or 
bureaucratic leadership at either the federal or the provincial level. 
In sharp contrast to The Decay of Trade is the other short book of the four 
under review. Paul Phillips' Regional Disparities (Toronto, James Lorimer and 
Company, 1978) is aimed at a large audience. So, at least, its manner would 
indicate. Its style lacks the clarity to serve the objective. The outcome is in large 
part turgid denunciation on the theme that the have-not regions are an economic 
hinterland exploited by Ontario, "which has so much", and particularly by big 
non-Canadian corporations. There are considerable elements of truth in the 
arguments, but their thrust seems to me essentially fraudulent. Phrases such as 
"the iron law of uneven development in capitalist economics" (p. 87) not only 
appeal to prejudice through a sweeping condemnation; they imply the possibility 
of far greater improvement than the author is prepared to specify. The real Mr. 
Phillips is not simple-minded. On the contrary, he at many points betrays 
understanding of the realities of industrial economics. One can imagine him, for 
example, as economic advisor to a nationalized steel industry doing a good job 
of explaining why investment in new equipment had to be made in southern 
Ontario and not in Cape Breton. But when in this book he comes to deal briefly 
with solutions, all he has to offer is "the restructuring of the Canadian economy 
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to bring the disparate regions into an integrated economic unit" (p. 128). There 
has to be a national industrial strategy, a national program of research and 
development for technology appropriate to Canada, and Canadian entre-
preneurship. To all of which one can say, in principle, "Amen"; but no one 
should pretend that anything specific to the particular difficulties of the Atlantic 
region has thereby been said. 
Mr. Phillips writes from Manitoba. The third of our books, Initiative and 
Response: The Adaptation of Canadian Federalism to Regional Economic 
Development (Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977) by Anthony 
G.S. Careless, is very much the product of Ontario. It should be an important 
study. It attempts to analyse in some detail the late 1960s efforts to formulate 
policies to lessen regional disparities; and it seeks to assess their impact on the 
institutions and inter-government relations of federalism. While Mr. Careless is 
to be admired for his ambition and there is much of interest in the result, the 
book is spoiled by two major faults. Mr. Careless seems unaware of the 
dangerousness of the little knowledge gained by bureaucratic exposure in an 
Ontario government department while he was a graduate student. He writes 
about the details of government process with a confidence that is unsupported by 
understanding of either the federal government or the other provinces. He there-
fore does not recognize the limitations of his sources and is prone to repeat 
partial description and comment as if it were the outcome of comprehensive 
fact-finding. Consequently, although he himself claims the detail as the distinc-
tion of his book, he has got a lot of it wrong. 
More serious, however, is the Ontario orientation to the federal role and the 
structure of confederation. Mr. Careless's concept of regional development 
seems to be, basically, that the federal authority should leave the provinces with 
plenty of room to do their thing. Consequently, although he is sympathetic to 
lessening regional disparities as an objective, he is unsympathetic to most of the 
instruments by which the federal government and the weaker provinces can in 
fact make any concentrated attack on disparities. The cost-shared programs 
which had been developed by the mid-60s in such matters as manpower training 
were much liked by the specialist bureaucrats at :Ottawa and in the richer 
provinces, but they meant that, under the program supposedly designed spe-
cially to train the unemployed, the federal government was spending $177 per 
unemployed person in Ontario and $34 in the Atlantic provinces. The federal 
initiatives of the later 60s, which are Mr. Careless's topic, were designed to tilt 
federal action away from such the-more-you-have-the-more-you-get situations. 
The book has no difficulty in demonstrating that officials of both the richer 
provinces and, to a large extent, Ottawa, were unhappy with such a trans-
formation, though their political leaders at both levels tended to be wiser. What 
it regrettably does not do with clarity is to analyse the federal initiatives in terms 
of objective, method, alternative and effect. We are left with the general 
impression that much has changed and we are not very happy about it and we 
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don't now know where we are going; which is in part true, but does not get us 
anywhere with regional development, particularly since the author has little to 
say about alternatives except perhaps by implication that we might have stayed 
how we were. 
Such weaknesses are the more understandable in the context of the fourth 
book. Mr. Lithwick's compendium, Regional Economic Policy: The Canadian 
Experience (Toronto, McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1978), is a well-chosen source 
book which does as much for students as the 1977 state of the literature 
permitted. Since the 26 items are considerably varied in purpose and manner, it 
can be misleading to give some special mention. But one has to say that the three 
taken from the Economic Council of Canada are not of the quality that could 
be expected from the Council's resources, while the authors whose con-
tributions are significant include J.F. Graham, R.L. McAllister and P.W. Fox. 
The main point, however, is the inadequacy of the material as a whole. It 
reflects, as the editor says, the absence of rigorous thinking about regional 
policy in Canada. Not the least of the difficulties is the frequent identification 
of region with provincial boundaries; but even if we did not have the jurisdic-
tional problem as to how to do things, there is little analytical base for any 
widely accepted view as to what we could do to lessen disparities. In particular, 
as Mr. Lithwick also suggests, both economists and policy-makers have done 
too little to penetrate the vast diversities of regions and provinces or to diagnose 
how our regions work and how they respond to various stimuli. 
From a Maritime viewpoint, what is especially unsatisfactory in much of the 
literature reviewed here is the frequent confusion of regional policy and regional 
development. It is fine to insist that in Canada national policy is viable only if it 
is built with sensitivity to regional issues. But southern Ontario, the lower 
mainland of B.C., and so on are just as much regions in this sense as, and indeed 
more influentially than, the poorer regions. The last thing that should attract the 
Maritimes is the bandwagon of regionalism if it means reducing the capacity of 
the federal government to use the only levers that can offset the tendencies 
militating against Maritime industry. 
The weakness of regional development analysis and the confusion with 
regionalism are accentuated because the first tends to be the exclusive concern of 
economists and the second of political scientists. Both disciplines are rep-
resented in Mr. Lithwick's selection, but for the most part they stand in their 
own territories and are no help to each other. Significantly, it is an economist of 
the previous generation — Vincent Bladen, represented by a short piece written 
44 years ago — who offers the clearest base for regional development policy. 
The gross national product is not the only objective, divorced from its distri-
bution: "Even in a unitary state I doubt whether the size of the aggregate income 
should be considered entirely apart from its regional distribution, still less in a 
federal state" (p. 185). He points to the unpaid social costs of people moving and 
to the unpayable costs of the break-up of communities, and then to the 
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additional significance of federalism, which "implies a guarantee of her [Nova 
Scotia's] right to continue as a community" (p. 186). Too little attention has 
been paid (this was in 1935) to the reconciliation of provincial interests in order 
"to achieve some rough equality in standard of living as between the provinces" 
(p. 187). A concluding comment that "inequality is always on the defensive" (p. 
187) deserves to stand as sufficient dismissal of some of the elaborate nonsense 
of contemporary economics. 
When regional development was politically popular the cause was briefly 
taken up not only by some over-enthusiastic entrepreneurs but even by econo-
mists prepared to argue that it was in fact the path to maximizing total 
Canadian income. In the Maritimes we would do well now to rely more on the 
perception of Bladen and the direct case for reasonable efforts to avoid the 
dissipation of communities. We can be developers without being seduced 
through dreams of marvellously high growth rates, of new bonanzas round the 
corner. Some at least of our regional priorities are surely now clear. We have to 
be enterprising and efficient in the marketing and producing for which we do 
have the resources; in other words, not repeat the errors so clear in the salt fish 
story. We have to ensure that the federal government redresses the structural 
imbalance of the economy by tilting the movement of capital firmly and steadily 
in our direction. As a region we have to learn to work in alliance instead of 
permitting provincial governments to paddle their own canoes so blindly and so 
competitively as they continue to do. 
Such priorities are clear but to get them accepted and acted on is extremely 
difficult, which perhaps explains why there has been so much inclination to look 
to the economists and bureaucrats for completer theories and grander designs. 
Yet it is escapism, and to read the literature is to confirm that what lies that way 
is continuing disappointment. If we are really concerned for the relative position 
of the region we have to organize ourselves for case-by-case, opportunity-by-
opportunity, hard-headed policy-making and creative enterprising. Perhaps the 
time will come when Canada has an appreciable volume of economic literature 
that provides insights for such work. But he would be a poor policy-maker or 
businessman who waited for it. Meantime the world moves and we cannot let the 
inadequacy of economic theory deter us from applying what wisdom we can to 
the tasks of improvement in the Maritime region. 
TOM KENT 
A Liberal Dose: Some Books About Public Men 
and Backroom Boys 
In one of the most interesting books about Canadian politics to appear in 
many a day, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal 
